

















Strategies and Lessons from 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, El 
Salvador and Sierra Leone 
Some thoughts from the rights to 
















Social Development Division 
















Santiago, Chile, September, 2006  
This document was prepared by Filip Filipov, intern from the University of 
Harvard, under the direction of Mrs. Carmen Artigas, chief of the Human Rights 
Unit, Social Development Division. The paper corresponds to the output with 
identifier 118582 of the Social Development Subprogram, 2006-2007, under 
subject area Human Rights, Democracy and Peace. It has been focused as a 
contribution to the work of the United Nations Peace Building Commission. 
The views expressed in this document, which has been reproduced without 
formal editing, are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of 


















United Nations Publication 
ISSN printed version 1564-4162 




Sales No.: E.06.II.G.138 
Copyright © United Nations, September 2006. All rights reserved 
Printed in United Nations, Santiago, Chile 
 
Applications for the right to reproduce this work are welcomed and should be sent to the 
Secretary of the Publications Board, United Nations Headquarters, New York, N.Y. 
10017, U.S.A. Member States and their governmental institutions may reproduce this 
work without prior authorization, but are requested to mention the source and inform the 
United Nations of such reproduction  
CEPAL - SERIE Políticas sociales N° 123 
3 
Index 
Summary ........................................................................................ 5 
Introduction........................................................................................ 7 
I. Background .............................................................................. 11 
II. Theory ...................................................................................... 15 
III. Historical Background and Lessons from the 
Cases of Bosnia and Herzegovina, El Salvador 
and Sierra Leone ..................................................................... 23 
 A. Bosnia and Herzegovina ...................................................... 23 
 B. El Salvador........................................................................... 27 
 C. Sierra Leone ......................................................................... 30 
IV. International Comparative Analysis................................... 35 
A. Education ............................................................................. 35 
B. Public Health........................................................................ 39 
C. Economic Indicators ............................................................ 44 
V. Lessons Learnt and Recommendations........................... 47 
A. Political Stability.................................................................. 47 
B. Economic Stability............................................................... 48 
C. Public Health........................................................................ 49 
D. Education ............................................................................. 49 
VI. Conclusion................................................................................ 51 
Bibliography..................................................................................... 53 
Serie Políticas sociales: issues published.............................. 55 
 
Post-conflict Peacebuilding: Strategies and Lessons from Bosnia and Herzegovina, El Salvador and Sierra Leone 
4 
Map Index 
Map 1  Ongoing Political and Peacebuilding Missions ..........................................................16 
Map 2  Bosnia and Herzegovina .............................................................................................24 
Map 3  El Salvador..................................................................................................................27 
Map 4  Sierra Leone................................................................................................................31 
Chart Index 
Chart 1  Public Spending on Education, Total (% of gdp) .......................................................36 
Chart 2  Literacy Rate. Adult Female (% of females ages 15 and above)................................37 
Chart 3  Literacy Rate, Adult Male (% of males ages 15 and above) ......................................37 
Chart 4  Literacy Rate, Youth Female (% of females ages 15-24)...........................................38 
Chart 5  Literacy rate, Youth Male (% of males ages 15-24)...................................................38 
Chart 6  Health Expenditure Total (% of GDP) .......................................................................39 
Chart 7  Health Expenditure per Capita (current US) ..............................................................39 
Chart 8  Births Attended by Skilled Health Staff (% of total) .................................................40 
Chart 9  Mortality Rate, Infant (per 1,000 live births) .............................................................41 
Chart 10  Mortality Rate, under-5 (per 1,000 births) .................................................................42 
Chart 11  Mortality Rate, Adult, Female, (per 1,000 adult females)..........................................42 
Chart 12  Mortality rate Adult, Male, (per 1,000 adult males)...................................................43 
Chart 13  Life Expectancy at Birth, Total (years) ......................................................................43 
Chart 14  GDP Growth (Annual %) ...........................................................................................44 
Table Index 








CEPAL - SERIE Políticas sociales N° 123 
5 
Summary 
The Report of the Secretary General of the United Nations on the 
implementation of the Millennium Declaration, entitled “In larger 
freedom: towards security, development and human rights for all”1 is a 
strong reminder of the need for an integrated approach to the various 
subjects considered therein, specially as they relate to the consolidation of 
democracy and of a durable peace. 
The subsequent establishment of the United Nations Peacebuilding 
Commission,2 has opened a promising instance for the contribution from 
different sectors to the fundamental task of post-conflict reconstruction. 
This process is clearly linked to the efforts dealing with conflict 
prevention, since one of the challenges of peacebuilding is precisely to 
face those deep root causes of the original conflicts whose reiteration 
could turn into the seed of a new conflict in the long term.  
It seems that UN components responsible for development issues 
could contribute to identify the economic and social causes which gave 
raise to the original conflict, and to put forward some strategies to revert 
them, specially focusing on the need to transit from humanitarian 
assistance to development.  
The present documents concentrates on the analysis of the post 
conflict reconstruction processes in three countries (Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, El Salvador and Sierra Leona), identifying similarities and 
differences and given special consideration to education and health issues. 
                                                     
1
  United Nations, In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all, Report of the Secretary General to the 
General Assembly ( A/59/2005), 21 March 2005.  
2
  United Nations, The Peacebuilding Commission, Resolution adopted by the General Assembly (A/RES/60/180), 30 December 2005.  
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It is expected that the paper may represent a contribution to the work of the Peacebuilding 
Commission, in the framework of the cooperation of this body with the Economic Commission for 
Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).  
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Introduction 
This paper attempts to establish the importance of the 
development of the systems of education and public health in areas 
emerging from intrastate armed conflict in the period of post-conflict 
peacebuilding. The new governments of the war-torn societies face the 
challenges of rebuilding the state while at the same time they need to 
address the causes of the civil conflict in such a way that will preclude 
a future return to violence. Frequently, the post-conflict peacebuilding 
strategies concentrate on the short-term political and economic 
stabilization, leaving out the social components of the state recovery 
for a later stage of the process. However, the elimination of the causes 
of the conflict usually necessitates a wider approach of capacity 
building that will lay the grounds for the future lasting peace. In that 
sense, the steps that are crucial to establish sustainable peace in such 
areas need to be studied closely, focusing on all parts relevant to 
peacebuilding.  
The increased number of conflict reoccurrence in post-conflict 
areas prompts that the current post-conflict peacebuilding strategies 
fall short of securing lasting peace in these regions. States such as 
Sierra Leone and Liberia have been fluctuating between war and 
peace, further decreasing the chances of ceasefire and affected the 
local population. The short-lived periods of relative peace have 
usually been established after foreign aid and international experts 
have been allocated to the regions. The concerted efforts of the local 
governments, NGOs, and various international actors achieve 
relatively easy the short-term goals of political and economic stability 
in the country. However, once the foreign financial aid and 
international assistance is gradually reduced, the states fail to sustain  
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the peace due to the lack of local human resources that are able to continue the already initiated 
policies. The poor social development in these areas affects the long-term goals of peacebuilding, 
thus exposing the country to a risk of conflict reoccurrence. 
The international community faces a promising challenge in supporting the efforts of these 
countries towards a lasting peace within the integrated framework of human rights, development 
and security, promoted by the United Nations.  
On the other side we have the experiences of countries such as Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
El Salvador which, in different contexts and degrees have sustained the peace for more than a 
decade, eliminating the chances of return to violence almost entirely. While foreign aid and 
international expertise have been gradually reduced over the years, the countries have developed 
strong social programs to supplement the political and economic stability and sustain peace. The 
systems of education and public health, although imperfect at their current stage, have experienced 
changes that presuppose the better involvement of society in the processes of peacebuilding. Thus, 
sustainable peace can be achieved on the local level, fighting the causes of conflict by including all 
social levels in the political and economic life through better education and public health. 
This study focuses on three cases of post-conflict peacebuilding: Bosnia and Herzegovina, El 
Salvador and Sierra Leone. The point of departure is the international comparison of post-conflict 
recovery and peacebuilding with respect to the political, economic, and social policies undertaken 
by the actors involved in the peacebuilding processes. The case selection offers a solid base for 
comparison due to the different levels of post-conflict recovery experienced by the three countries: 
while Bosnia and Herzegovina has already gone a long way after the official end of the civil 
conflict, the remaining countries are still experiencing different forms of local tensions that might, 
in some cases, destroy the fragile peace in the region and push the parties back into violence. 
Moreover, the cases range in their conflict intensities, actors involved in the post-conflict recovery, 
and peacebuilding strategies and policies. The international comparative study will offer various 
insights on how to approach current areas of conflict and how to strategize post-conflict 
peacebuilding recovery. The lessons learned from Bosnia and Herzegovina, El Salvador, and Sierra 
Leone will be utilized constructing a broad framework for state recovery that might be useful for 
locales of civil conflict such as Colombia and Haiti, once a final peace agreement is achieved.  
The main argument is built on the significance of the creation of solid systems of public 
health and education as part of the post-conflict recovery of a state. It is argued that long-term 
development and lasting peace depends on the human resources and the society of the war-
devastated state, since most peacebuilding missions and strategies focus solely on a fast-lane 
economic and political stability achieved in the short-term, but sometimes hard to sustain after 
peacebuilding organizations withdraw from the country. Emphasis is put on the strategies that 
diminish the risk of conflict reoccurrence once relative peace has been achieved. Naturally, the 
argument recognizes the importance of political and economic stability as a precondition for lasting 
peace. The procurement of social development necessitates a healthy environment to reach the 
levels needed to sustain peace and security after the withdrawal of the peacebuilding actors. At the 
same time, emphasis is placed on the fact that that negligence of social development might be 
critical in conflict reoccurrence and that should have equal standing in strategizing for post-conflict 
recovery.  
The paper is divided into three four: peacebuilding theory and trends, historical background 
of the studied cases, comparative study of social components involved in the building of civil 
society, and recommendation for future peacebuilding strategies. The first part addresses the 
current scholarly work in the field and assesses the suggested strategies for recovering warn-torn 
societies. More specifically, it considers the existing patterns of post-conflict peacebuilding and 
suggest recommendation based on the available cases. This part also discusses how this paper 
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contributes and builds on the existing theories. The second part provides historical background of 
the studies cases in order to illustrate the similarities and differences involved in the conflict 
escalation and peace agreements. Additionally, the lessons learnt from the peacebuilding processes 
serve as the basis for creating a more focused approach in other areas affected by conflict, such as 
Colombia or Haiti. 
It analyzes statistical data in support of the main argument. Measurements such as health 
system and education indicators (for example literacy rates, life expectancy rates, etc) and 
economic performance help the evaluation of the importance of public health and education in 
post-conflict areas. The last part makes recommendation about future peacebuilding strategies and 
how peacebuilding efforts should be structured to produce more effective results.  
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I. Background 
Since the end of the Cold War, the world has witnessed an 
increasing number of intrastate conflicts. Civil struggles in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Liberia, Sierra Leone, 
Colombia, and Kosovo, just to name a few, have drawn the attention 
of the international community. Only in 1995, thirty of the major 
conflicts in the world were within the political boundaries of a state, 
opposing government forces and revolutionary groups vying for 
political and economic power3. Even though it would be hard to say 
that the period between the end of World War II and the end of the 
Cold War lacked conflicts on national and regional levels, the 1990s 
have been characterized by new epicenters of civil unrest and war 
theaters that evolve constantly, frequently in places that have already 
secured a peace agreement between the parties to the conflict.  
While the Cold War period was marked by the bipolar model of 
competing world powers when intervention even in the name of 
restoring peace was difficult, if not impossible, the post-Cold War 
dynamics have created new opportunities for international collaboration 
in approaching armed conflict to the end of establishing lasting peace. 
The United Nations, previously forced to remain neutral in a series of 
cases due to the power politics of the permanent members of the 
Security Council, have more room to operate internationally by 
providing help in the peacebuilding processes, thus accelerating capacity 
building and state recovery in conjunction with other factors pertinent to 
the  restoration  of  peace  and security.  Concreted  efforts,  inflow  of 
                                                     
3
  Margareta Sollenberg and Peter Wallensteen, "Major Armed Conflicts," in SIPRI Yearbook 1996: Armaments, Disarmament, and 
International Security (Oxford, UK: 1996). Cited in Roland Paris, "Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism," 
International Security 22, No. 2 (1997). 54. 
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international aid and foreign expertise prove crucial for war-torn societies in their attempt to 
finalize conflict and create politically and economically stable societies by overcoming the 
struggles for power executed by the sides involved in the internal conflicts. 
The strategies mainly employed in the post-conflict peacebuilding processes include a wide 
range of activities. NGOs, international financial institutions and development agencies as well as 
local and national actors cover a whole gamut of ventures to ensure the healthy recovery of war-
devastated states. Disarmament of combatants, procurement of political and economic concessions 
to stabilize the state, development of infrastructure, and consolidation of the legal, financial, and 
political systems are just part of the focal points that undergo changes in the years immediately 
following the peace agreements. The main mission is “to identify and support structures which will 
tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.”4 The task, 
straightforward as it may seem, cannot be easily accomplished. Unfortunately, in a lot of the cases 
the peacebuilding efforts prove not to be sufficient. Focused on financial strategies and the 
enactment of a new government, peacebuilding forces seem to omit the social components in 
strategizing how to create durable peace. The society and local actors are not adequately prepared 
to take on the responsibilities related to the consolidation of durable peace. Thus, politically and 
economically stable states return to conflict once the foreign aid is reduced and international 
experts leave the country. 
Even when peace is secured through concessions on both sides regarding the future political 
and economic status of the parties, rarely any effort is made towards a long-term halt of hostilities 
that would lead to a thorough recovery of the post-conflict area. Indisputably, international 
assistance is crucial in building the foundations for the creation of lasting peace. However, 
excessive foreign interference in terms of economic resources and know-how usually create heavily 
aid-dependent states. Relying on foreign resources, local governments rarely attempt to devise and 
implement policies that would lead to the construction of a strong civil society ready to support 
peace without external assistance. Similarly, economies receiving foreign funds find it difficult to 
continue growth and development once the aid is gradually reduced. Even though the causes of the 
expected collapse of the political and economic systems are not single-handedly related to the lack 
of social development and adequately trained human resources, they play a major role in the 
recovery of post-conflict areas. In this sense, relapse to conflict can be seen through the prism of 
weak social development that is unable to support the political and economic systems. 
Additionally, the causes of the conflict are hardly addressed directly, thus leaving space for 
the parties to exploit the delicate situation: opportunism and lack of incentives to keep the peace 
intact create imbalances between the parties, in this manner jeopardizing the status quo by starting 
the war again. Politico-economic or identity based in their nature, the causes of the conflict could 
only be approached through broader strategies that touch upon on all of the related actors of the 
conflict. The collapse of peace and return to violence is not necessarily grounded in the inherent 
characteristics of the warring parties. The warring parties (revolutionary groups, civil forces, 
governments, military groups, etc) are the primer concern for the peacebuilding actors. However, 
since the society as a whole is involved in one way or another in the civil struggles, peacebuilders 
should concentrate on programs and initiatives that aim at the social development of the nation.   
The reoccurrence of conflict after the establishment of fragile peace prompts international 
actors that a new approach of brokering peace and organizing state recovery is crucial if peace is to 
last. Faulty peacebuilding strategies and inaccurately targeted relief additionally diffuse the 
effectiveness of the recovery of post-conflict areas, thus exacerbating the problems incited by the 
political and economic dependence on external actors. The panorama suggests that we take a closer 
                                                     
4
  Boutros Boutros-Ghali "An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking, and Peace-Keeping," (New York: United 
Nations, 1992). Cited in Paris, "Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism." 55. 
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look at the already existing cases of both effective and unsatisfactory peacebuilding processes and 
strategies used in post-conflict areas. Evaluation of on-going mission and regions that have already 
completed post-war recovery will offer invaluable information about the factors that determine 
effectiveness in terms of establishing lasting peace and security.  
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II. Theory 
Post-conflict peacebuilding has been on the agenda of the United 
Nations and major scholars in the years following the end of the Cold 
War, when the number of intrastate conflicts increased rapidly. While 
some of the conflicts had been carried out for years before international 
actors and NGOs directed their attention to them, new hearths of conflict 
appeared in politically fluctuating zones that suddenly were not 
dependent on the major powers anymore. Sadly, even the presence of 
international peacekeeping missions containing peacebuilding 
components, the inflow of foreign aid and heightened number of NGOs 
failed to address the post-conflict environment appropriately to 
accomplish a full-scale recovery of war-torn states. Relapse to conflict 
had equal chances to appear after the manifested end of hostilities, 
reaching the rate of 50 per cent of conflict reoccurrence in the past 20 
years, when previous conflict areas returned to violence within five 
years after the signing of a peace agreement.5  
This negative balance prompted major international actors, such 
as the United Nations, that the formation of a new mechanism to deal 
with post-conflict peacebuilding was imperative for restructuring 
current strategies to the end of achieving durable peace. During the 
World Summit in 2005, the Member states decided to create the 
Peacebuilding Commission, which was officially inaugurated on June 
23, 2006. The Commission will, inter alia, suggest multifaceted 
strategies for PCPB and recovery, secure funding for recovery 
activities  and sustained  investment  aimed at  the medium to longer-
term period after the peace agreement, and extend the period of the  
                                                     
5
  President Jan Eliasson cited in "General Assembly," in UN Chronicle (New York: United Nations, 2005). 
Post-conflict Peacebuilding: Strategies and Lessons from Bosnia and Herzegovina, El Salvador and Sierra Leone 
16 
PCPB missions.6 The Commission will concentrate on the “reconstruction, institution-building and 
sustainable development in countries emerging from conflict.”7 Being a separate body of the United 
Nations, the Peacebuilding Commission will put in perspective a more incorporated approach of 
PCPB (Post-conflict peacebuilding) schematizing strategies that avoid previously made mistakes 
and suggest new ways of rebuilding war-devastated states in conjunction with other relevant actors 
from the international community.  
Since its creation in 1948, the United Nations have been involved in a total 60 peacekeeping 
missions, much of them involving a peacebuilding component as well. Currently, there are 12 political 
and peacebuilding ongoing missions around the world (See Map 1 Ongoing Political and 
Peacebuilding Operations), some of which are in places that have been fluctuating between war and 
peace in the last 15 years. The relative success of some of the missions (Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Kosovo) contrasts the reiterated efforts of the international community to settle down conflicts in 
problematic areas (Sierra Leone, Liberia, Haiti) and raises the question of effective PCPB strategies 
and the importance of an all-inclusive approach towards securing lasting peace. Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and Kosovo, for example, have managed to establish durable peace. Even though minor 
clashes between factions did occur right after the conflict, the regions have been characterized by 
political and economic stability and social development, thus eradicating almost entirely the causes of 
the intrastate conflict, and practically eliminating the possibility of conflict reoccurrence. Others, such 
as Sierra Leone and Liberia constantly return to violence and still have a long way to go before they 
reach a final peace agreement that will satisfy all parties involved in the conflict.  
Map 1 
























Source: Department of Peacekeeping Operations. Available at: http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/ppbm.pdf. 
Retrieved on July 17, 2006. 
                                                     
6
  Peacebuilding Commision website. Available at: http://www.un.org/peace/peacebuilding/questions.htm Accessed on July 17, 2006. 
7
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The main problem with the consolidation of a PCPB approach stems from the strategies 
employed by international and local actors that aspire to a quick and easy solution to peace. Often, 
peacebuilders concentrate more on short-term positive results. Still, frequently the strategies 
leading to them do not effectively address the roots of the conflict, leaving room for reoccurrence. 
In order to comprehend the dynamics of conflict, one should study the causes lying behind the civil 
struggle. Berdal and Malone divide the causes of conflict in two main categories: politico-
economic based and identity based. The first partition explains conflict through the prism of 
politics and economics, arguing that politico-economic reasons play a major role in the context of 
causes for conflict reoccurrence. Collier, on the contrary, suggests that the main reasons that 
countries relapse into conflict are identity based.8 Influential groups, local elites and economic 
magnates run the agenda of the war-torn state, opposing factions on the higher levels of society. 
Each actor struggles for their own political and economic power, leaving the population outside the 
realm of decision-making processes, nevertheless indisputably involving the citizens in the conflict. 
Politico-economic based conflicts tend to persist over time by self-perpetuating the already existing 
clashes between the groups. While PCPB involves a political and economic solution to the 
problems, it would be rare if all of the demands from the various sides are satisfied.  
Moreover, once the international assistance is gradually withdrawn, the political and 
economic elites are likely to be opportunistic in establishing a status quo that would best benefit 
them. The logic is simple: since most of the efforts are directed towards the short-term revival of 
the economy and stabilization of the political system of the state, the government cuts spending on 
social programs and policies promoting local peacebuilding efforts9. Additionally, since “most 
internal conflicts are triggered by internal elite-level activities (bad leaders),”10 one can expect that 
high class political and economic elites will direct poorly the recovery in these sections, or 
intentionally divert efforts of state building towards the aforementioned spheres. In that sense, the 
lower classes of the society are deprived from basic social services, including public health and 
education. Therefore, political and economic players can easily take advantage of the vulnerable 
citizenships for two reasons: the exclusion of the latter from the decision-making processes due 
their historical non-elite status; and the inability of the lower classes to receive education and 
public health services that will eventually make parts of the society competitive on the market and 
able to participate vigorously in the economic and political life. Thus, the politico-economic bases 
conflict furthers the divide between the upper and lower classes of society, precluding any form of 
participation of “outsiders” and even impeding the natural creation of educated and sound civil 
society.  
Politico-economic based conflict also has dire side effects on the long-term recovery and 
capacity building of the country. Social programs that need to be developed remain underfinanced, 
forcing the lower classes of the population to be dependent on the whims of the elites. Poor 
education and inadequate public health services impede the social development of the human 
capital. Naturally, the problems become more complicated, since the lack of education and the 
fluctuation of health predetermine the low market competitiveness, which indisputably leads to 
higher unemployment levels in these portions of the population. The vicious circle is closed 
completely when long unemployment leads to increased poverty, which in its turn suggests that if 
health services and education are not readily available for the poor, they will not be able to afford 
                                                     
8
  For a discussion of the argument as well as Collier’s counterpo0int, see Mats Berdal and David M. Malone, Greed and Grievance 
(London: Lynne Rienner, 2000),.see Pyt S. Douma, "The Political Economy of Internal Conflict: A Review of Contemporary Trends 
and Issues.," (Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael', 2001). 
9
   N Plank, "Aid, Debt, and the End of Sovereignty: Mozambique and Its Donors," Journal of Modenr African Studies 31, No. 3 
(1993). See also Caroline Hartzell and Matthew Hoddie, "Institutionalizing Peace: Power Sharing and Post-Civli War Conflict 
Management," American Journal of Political Science 47, No. 2 (2003). Page 330 for a full discussion of the effects of spending cuts 
on social services in El Salvador. 
10
  Michael E. Brown, ed., The International Dimension of Internal Conflict (Cambridge, London: MIT Press, 1996). Cited in Douma, 
"The Political Economy of Internal Conflict: A Review of Contemporary Trends and Issues." 
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it. Thus, cuts in social spending fuel the class divisions. In that sense, individuals facing poverty 
and unemployment are more likely to join military and revolutionary groups to provide for their 
families, since in most of the cases this seems to be the only solution to their problems.  
The second category of conflict causes is explained through the prism of identity based 
struggles. Some of the conflicts addressed by the international community are not new on the 
agenda. Sierra Leone, Liberia, Georgia, Armenia, Rwanda, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and 
other regions have suffered from identity clashes between major parts of their populations. Cultural 
differences, the history of conflict, and the indisposition to reach a conclusive peace agreement 
complicate the PCPB. Even if an ad hoc end of hostilities is brokered, it is unlikely to last because 
of the grievances experienced during previous battles. The parties involved in the conflict easily 
relapse back to violence marked by rapid escalation. The struggle is seen as an acute zero-sum 
game, opposing larger parts of the citizenry and in practice involving everyone within the state, 
even if they do not belong to the fighting sides. Economic development and political stability do 
not play a major role in the conflict dynamics in consideration of the inability of the parties to put 
down arms and forget cultural difference in the name of peace and security.  
Identity-based conflict feeds on easy combatant recruitment from the lower classes of the 
population. Similarly to the politico-economic based conflicts, again the problems with social 
development are not addressed directly. NGOs, international financial institutions and local actors 
try to establish sound political and economic systems that attempt to divert the attention of the 
combatants from the cultural clashes in order to create more economic and political incentives for 
the parties to the conflict to stop fighting. In this type of conflicts, social development is even more 
essential in brokering lasting peace, since the cultural divides can be overcome mainly by 
educational programs installed in a sound civil society. Diminishing inequalities between different 
classes of the population is also important, since the social structure is multidimensional: political 
and economic elites are opposed on the top of the social ladder against each other, simultaneously 
at odds with the poor portions of the population on both sides of the identity-based conflict. Thus, 
differences should be considered at all levels and in all of the political, economic, and social 
spheres.  
The discussion of the different types of conflict suggests that social development is an 
integral part of the PCPB. In all of the cases, the peacebuilding processes should be inclusive rather 
than exclusive. Naturally, as mentioned before, a more comprehensive approach towards 
peacebuilding should not transform PCPB strategies in favor of social programs at the expense of 
political and economic recovery. As Zartman argues, state decline can be stopped, and “the 
degenerative process can be reversed by rebuilding institutions and restoring the social fabric of 
society.”11 Rather, efforts to rebuild a war-torn society should be equally exerted in all fields, 
contributing to the general well-being of the citizenry by providing accessible social services in an 
economically and politically secure environment. In order to achieve lasting peace, the PCPB 
should concentrate more on the long-term recovery and capacity building that will eventually allow 
post-conflict regions to sustain the peace when international aid and personnel is gradually 
reduced.  
The literature on the questions of PCPB refers to various approaches that would improve the 
conditions of war-torn states, if applied in a timely manner. Keith Krause and Oliver Jutersonke 
argue that external actors are not necessarily “the most important agents of or catalysts for 
change.”12 Post-conflict difficulties cannot be merely overcome by more financial aid, better 
                                                     
11
  W.I. Zartman, Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority (London: Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner, 
1995). Cited in Pyt S. Douma, "The Political Economy of Internal Conflict: A Review of Contemporary Trends and Issues," 
(Netherlands Institute of International Relations ’Clingendael’, 2001).  
12
  Keith Krause and Oliver Jutersonke, "Peace, Security and Development in Post-Conflict Environments," Security Dialogue 36, No. 
4 (2005), p. 454. 
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planning or coordination, because these remedies disregard the importance of local knowledge and 
dismisses local power dynamics.13 The authors suggest that post-conflict states concentrate on 
building political, economic, and social institution that will entail “capacity-building, good 
governance, inclusion, economic opportunity and individual well-being.”14 An all-inclusive strategy 
will assure the creation of power-sharing institution at the local level that will be able to handle 
struggles for power between the competing groups. Coordination among these institutions will 
lower the opportunity cost of returning to violence, since strongly involved groups in the 
institutionalized framework would incur loses, if conflict returned. Thus, the key to sustainable 
peace lies within the local development and engagement of relevant actors that will be limited in 
their actions due to the strongly established power-sharing institutions.  
At the same time, the external factors should not be dismissed. The building of the 
aforementioned power-sharing institutions cannot be solely accomplished by the local actors, since 
they would still deem conflict as a profitable enterprise. The idea that Krause and Jutersonke put 
forward is strengthened by the arguments proposed by Roland Paris. He posits that current PCPB 
strategies of liberal internationalism are not successful because the international community and 
the local actors seek a rapid recovery that needs to be achieved in demanding deadlines. The 
economic liberalization and elected new governments are conducive to development and growth, 
but they disregard the necessity of a gradual process that will lead to social development and 
lasting peace. Liberal internationalism supports the creation of thriving economies in sound 
democracies in the long-run, but simultaneously societies suffer from policies that incite “greater 
inequalities, resulting in civil unrest.”15 Paris offers five measures to combat the negative effects of 
liberal internationalism: gradual democratization, promotion of moderation, growth-oriented 
policies, centralized peacebuilding operations, and extension of the duration of the PCPB. 
Gradual and strictly managed democratization will avoid hastily put together governments in 
an attempt to secure political stability. According to Paris, elections should be delayed after a peace 
agreement has been signed to give time to the society and warring parties to recover and distance 
themselves from the conflict passions. Additionally, citizen associations that impede the spread of 
extremist propaganda and promote moderation should be developed and installed before a final 
political solution is achieved. Thus, the elected government will be representative of the real needs 
of the society rather than just merely placed in power by the post-conflict reaction of the war-torn 
society. Paris builds on the idea of gradual democratization by recommending electoral 
arrangements in favor of moderation and peace. He argues that extremism should be condemned by 
means of electoral associations and processes, which will eventually lessen the effects of opposing 
parties. Managed democratization will also lay the foundations for lasting and stable political 
atmosphere extending beyond the petty struggles for power. 
Paris’ third proposition includes the promotion of growth-oriented adjustment policies and 
the exclusion of austerity measures as means of achieving short-term positive results. The 
embryonic situation of state recovery immediately after the peace agreement presupposes sacrificial 
policies directed towards political stabilization and economic revival. Short-term oriented in their 
nature, such harsh policies sometimes dismiss growth-related factors in order to foster a peaceful 
environment. Frequently, politics and economics abate the value of social programming that will 
lay the foundations of growth and development in the future. Paris suggests that PCPB processes 
include all components related to the establishment of durable peace, pushing forward the notion 
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that peace should be promoted in a gradual and stable process of state recovery, rather than 
sacrificial course of selecting short-term results over long-term stability.  
Extended peacebuilding operations and centralized management and coordination are the last 
recommendations for post-conflict areas. PB operations typically last for a short period of time that 
aims at the rapid stabilization of the political and economic spheres. At the same time, much of the 
efforts to achieve this goal are decentralized, thus unintentionally diminishing the value of the 
enacted policies. Local actors, NGOs and international organizations usually work in discord in 
their attempt to recover various sectors of the war-torn state, which sometimes contrasts 
peacebuilding policies or mismatches resources. Additionally, the timing and duration of 
peacebuilding processes might prove vital for the final results. A positive step in this direction has 
already been taken through the establishment of the Peacebuilding Commission of the United 
Nations, which will provide the necessary agility and push for more collaboration as the single 
center of management. In that sense, more coordinated and longer lasting peace operation infer 
better allocation of resources, stronger and longer presence of policy-enforcing institutions and 
organizations, and an all-inclusive rather than disorganized and spotty actions on behalf of the 
peacebuilders. 
From the ad hoc evaluation of PCPB strategies, one can infer that cases of war-torn societies 
should be addressed more specifically within the framework of a broader recovery plan that makes 
projections for the long-term peace and security in the region. As seen in the discussion of the 
current scholarly opinion on the topic, economic and political stabilization does not necessarily 
lead to conflict solution, but rather predetermines relapse to conflict by enhancing the inequality 
between the social classes. An overall assessment how to deliberate on PCPB strategies would 
include the effective elimination of the causes of the conflict (politico-economic based or identity 
based),16 establishment of power-sharing institutions, gradual and monitored democratization, 
relevant economic and political measures, and coordinated and extended post-conflict 
peacebuilding operations. Moreover, long-term policies fostering social development seem to be 
vital in creating durable peace, even though such programs might demand far more resources than 
the available aid from foreign countries and institutions. However, social development programs 
carried out simultaneously with the aforementioned measures will naturally lead to capacity 
building, which will ease peacebuilding by including all social layers in the process of state 
recovery. 
Before we close the theory section, this chapter will briefly discuss the significance of some 
social services that will provide ground for the further social development and recovery in war-
shattered societies. The system of public health is instrumental in creating the necessary 
environment. Sites of conflict are characterized by destroyed infrastructure and weakened health 
services in times when the society needs them most. The decreased number of qualified medical 
staff paired with the likelihood of epidemics and spread of diseases during and after the conflict 
increases the probability the individuals will need more medical assistance. Therefore, the recovery 
of the public health system presupposes concerted efforts on behalf of the peacebuilders and the 
local government in order to assure that the population is not substantially affected and is able to 
participate in the rebuilding of the state. Lowered quality of medical assistance leaves out larger 
than usual portions of the labor force unable to perform their duties, which in turn translates into 
economic slow down if the problem persists over time. 
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Additionally, increased numbers of people are usually displaced during a conflict. Forced out 
to leave their homes and jobs in order to seek refuge in safer parts of the region, displaced people 
involuntarily slow down peacebuilding processes and economic growth because they burden 
certain regions and leave others scarcely populated. The safe return of displaced people should be 
one of the priorities of the new government after the peace accords have been signed in order to 
normalize the pre-conflict levels of population and resource distribution. In this manner, economic 
stability and social development can be achieved more easily, since resources and efforts will be 
spread over different regions of the country and benefit more individuals, rather than be 
concentrated in one part.  
The next step for PCPB is the challenge of creating sound civil society. Even though NGO 
programs and government policies address partially the needs of affected individuals or 
communities to be reintegrated in the social, political, and economic life of the country, the efforts 
are usually sporadic and insufficient to achieve their goal, since the scarce resources and spotty 
distributions leave out significant parts of the citizenry. Along these lines, the establishment of a 
sound system of education might prove to be crucial for the capacity building and development of 
human resources that will be the engine of the post-conflict recovery. Consolidation of education 
also suggests that the country will develop human resources for the long-term political and 
economic stability by providing citizens with the opportunity to get involved in the various sectors 
demanding qualified staff. An important part of the consolidation of the system of education is the 
inclusion of former combatants in the recovery of the country. Most of the fighters joined the 
militant groups because of their poor education and training that resulted in unemployment. 
Moreover, the search for trained employees in the economic and political sectors will increase the 
demand for education, which requires more investment and increased social spending in this area. 
Naturally, there are other stimuli for reviving the system of education: people will be more 
involved in the political and economic dynamics, serving as a barometer for the changes that are 
being executed in the post-conflict period. 
Another important factor of addressing the post-conflict reality is the reduction of poverty. 
As Paris notes, greater levels of economic inequalities result in civil unrest, which increases the 
likelihood of conflict reoccurrence. The poor members of the society are more tempted to fall into 
the traps of fighting groups since this is considered a chance to step out of their current economic 
situation. The aforementioned strengthening of the systems of public health and education is a 
move towards reduction of poverty, since it will allow the poorest members of society to get 
reintegrated in the economic life again. Once dependent on the economic forces, the members of 
society will have more incentives to preserve the created status quo, because the opportunity cost of 
returning to conflict would be too high. At the same time, political and economic elites will become 
more dependent on the work force, which will preclude any one-side exploitation of resources.  
The theory concerning PCPB sums up the challenges faced by the international community 
in achieving post-conflict recovery in war-torn societies. The roots of the conflict, the processes of 
democratization and economic liberalization, and the functions of the peacebuilding operations 
offer significant obstacles that might impede the establishment of durable peace. However, with 
more efforts in these areas aiming at consolidating the power-sharing institutions, addressing the 
causes of social tensions, developing relevant social policies, and as a whole creating a sound civil 
society that is able to face the challenges of sustaining stability and peace, post-conflict areas will 
increase the chances of state recovery and capacity building. Naturally, each case is specific, which 
presents the notion that an all-inclusive and general strategy might be successful in some regions, 
but might prove useless, or even regressive, in other. Nevertheless, the lessons learnt from the 
existing cases of effective and failed peacebuilding can teach us how to handle future situations of 
intrastate conflict.  
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III. Historical Background and 
Lessons from the Cases of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, El 
Salvador and Sierra Leone 
This section of the paper discusses the historical background of 
the studied cases, focusing on the conflict escalation, the route to 
peace and the post-conflict situation in the countries. I emphasize the 
education and public health policies that have been undertaken since 
the end of the intrastate wars, simultaneously considering other 
factors, such as political and economic performance, in order to 
evaluate the PCPB effectiveness. 
A.  Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (See Map 2 Bosnia and Herzegovina) is 
still recovering from the war that broke out in April 1992 and ended 
with the Dayton ceasefire agreement signed in the United States on 
November 21, 1995. The conflict that started after the referendum for 
independence of the former Yugoslav republic led to 100,000 deaths, 
both civilian and military, and nearly 1.3 million internally displaced 
people and refugees that fled the country to seek security in neighboring 
states.17 The post-conflict state recovery and capacity building includes 
building of infrastructure, consolidation of the political and economic 
systems,  and  increase  in the  quality  and number  of  social  services 
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offered to the citizens. Additionally, the government has attempted to revive the economy and 
normalize the demographic panorama by creating incentives for displaced persons and refugees to 
return to their homes.  
Map 2  













































Source: Economist Intelligence Unit. El Salvador: Country Profile 2005. 
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The disintegration of the Soviet Union and its decreasing support of Yugoslavia provoked 
the gradual dissolution of the heterogeneous system of the Socialist Federal Republic. Losing 
ideological grounds due to separatist and nationalist movements that had started to gain momentum 
in the late 1980s, Yugoslavia witnessed the separation of Croatia and Slovenia at the beginning of 
the 1990s. The increased ethnic tensions in the region of Bosnia and Herzegovina prompted the 
local government to conduct a referendum and decide whether to stay within the sovereignty of 
Yugoslavia or exist as a separate political entity. On March 1, 1992 two-thirds of the population 
voted in favor of independence with almost unanimous consent – 99%.18 The rest of the population, 
mostly Bosnian Serbs, followed the advice of the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) and boycotted 
the plebiscite.  
While Bosniaks (Muslims living in Bosnia) and Croats celebrated the results, the Bosnian 
Serbs fortified their position in the eastern and north-western parts of Bosnia. On April 6, 1992, the 
official date of independence, Serb militias occupied large territories of the country, provoking a 
fierce opposition on behalf of the Muslims and Croats. The Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA), which 
had officially left Bosnia and Herzegovina after the referendum, occupied the eastern parts of the 
country and claimed the control of strategic points. The members of SDS along with the population 
proclaimed the territory Republika Srpska and established ad hoc government offices in cities and 
villages. Not willing to secede parts of the newly formed country, Muslims and Croats started a 
three-way war trying to gain control over Bosnia. As the conflict escalated, the United Nations 
extended the mission of previously dispatched troops in Croatia to Sarajevo in order to ensure that 
food and other humanitarian supplies had a safe passage to reach the needy population. However, 
the mission was interrupted by numerous raids on behalf of the warring parties. Later, on August 
13, 1992, Resolution 770 of the UN Security Council required the parties of the conflict to take all 
necessary measures in order to secure the distribution of humanitarian aid in the region and called 
for the deployment of military personnel to assist the locals in that task. 
The growing concern of the international community provoked peace talks in London the 
same month, initiated by UK foreign secretary, David Owen, and US secretary of state Cyrus 
Vance. The Croats of Herzeg-Bosnia, the Muslims and the Serbs represented by Slobodan 
Milosevic agreed to the plan on May 2, which included the deployment of 65,000 to 70,000 UN 
troops, a large part of which were to be US soldiers. Nevertheless, the plan failed, since the 
Bosnian Serbs refused to take part of it despite Milosevic’s insistence. Additionally, Bill Clinton 
was unwilling to send US forces to secure the peace in the region, since Washington considered the 
issue to be primarily a European concern. At the same time, the European states decided not to 
carry out the peace agreements, hesitant to dispatch troops without US support.  
The three-front war between Muslims, Croats and Bosnian Serbs continued, despite the 
efforts of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR). The UN Security Council 
Resolutions 824 and 836 adopted in May and June 1993 created “safe areas.” Shortly after that, a 
peace zone around Sarajevo marked the transformation of UNPROFOR from purely humanitarian 
mission to a peacekeeping one as well. Before the final agreement had been reached by the Bosnian 
Government, Serbia and Croatia, the world witnessed many small scale clashes interrupted by the 
massacre in Srebrenica, when more than 8,000 Bosniaks were executed by the army of Ratko 
Mladic. The bloody July caught the attention of Washington, which brought the sides to the 
negotiations table in Dayton, Ohio in November. The final peace agreement was signed on 
December 14, 1995 in Paris, when the parties conceded to the proposed political solutions to the 
problem.  
The fluctuations between peace and conflict made it difficult for the three parties to reach a 
final political and economic decision. The agreement created a new structure that divided the state 
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in two entities: the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Muslims and Croats) and Republika 
Srpska (Bosnian Serbs). Republika Srpska comprised 49% of the territory, leaving the Federation 
with 51% divided in 10 cantons.19 The Dayton Agreement aimed at the stimulation of rapid and 
complete recovery by suggesting policies of social mobility (all members of the territory were 
allowed to move freely within the two political entities), economic revival, and political 
consolidation. The constitution calls for an equal three-way division of power among the 
ethnicities: the government system includes members from all of the ethnic groups, thus allowing 
for uniform representation and strong power-sharing institutions.  
Strong economic policies and elaborated social programming led to the relatively quick 
recovery of the war-torn society (see the section of data analysis below for a detailed comparative 
discussion of public health and education policies). Capacity building and engagement of the 
society in the political, economic, and social life of the country addressed effectively the identity-
based causes of the conflict guiding the unification of the different social and ethnic strata into a 
well-functioning entity. A crucial part of the post-conflict recovery was played by the reforms in 
the public health and education sectors. Even though the relatively high quality levels of health 
services offered in the pre-war period were not easy to be reached, the reforms in the sector have 
been improving the services offered to the public. World Bank loans and international aid helped 
jump-start the public health system by recovering destroyed infrastructure and enhancing the 
conditions of the medical workers. Due to the stable levels of physicians per 10,000 people, 
hospital beds, and qualified staff, the life expectancy and health service coverage have constantly 
grown over the years. Infant mortality and under-5 mortality rates have also gone down due to the 
concerted efforts of the government and various international organizations working in the sector.  
The high spending in the sector can be underestimated owing to the low position of the 
public health services in comparison with the standards of the European Union. Even though 
Bosnia and Herzegovina still needs to go a long way before reaching the quality levels of 
developed countries, indisputable progress after the war improved the system of public health, 
leading to an overall healthier society and better health services offered to the population. The 
advances in the sector have had side effects on other sectors in the country, allowing the labor force 
to participate actively in the economic life, thus precluding undesired interruption in the processes 
of economic and political stabilization.  
The system of education has suffered from low funding by the government, since most 
efforts have been directed towards the recovery of the economy and infrastructure pertinent to 
development and economic progress. The problems of understaffed schools, still damaged 
infrastructure, and parallel systems of education among Bosnian Serbs, Bosnian Croats and Muslim 
persist, but pending reforms aim to reduce the ineffectiveness of the system. Nevertheless, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina shows incredibly high levels of literacy rate among the different age groups, 
which translates in a better qualified labor force. The focus of the educational programs moves 
from the predominant sphere of humanities to sciences and engineering, contributing to the 
progressing sector of research and development in the country. Practices from Western Europe and 
the United States have been employed in all levels of education – primary, secondary, and tertiary – 
and despite the low pace of reforms, the situation is improving. Overall, the policies that have been 
undertaken are insufficient in comparison with Western Europe, but are significant in troubled 
areas recovering from internal conflict. 
The proposed solutions to the conflict directly addressed the causes that forced the parties to 
start the war. Bosnia and Herzegovina was separated from Yugoslavia, even though Republika 
Srpska was de facto under the rule of Slobodan Milosevic. The ethnic tensions were subdued by the 
policies of the three-way government and equal distribution of power, thus creating stable political 
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environment for economic revival and heightened social policies for the post-conflict peacebuilding 
and state recovery. Additionally, the European Union extended its peacebuilding operations over a 
long period of time, leaving troops and officials functioning in the area well after the Dayton Peace 
Agreement. The policies conducted over the ten-year period of peace resulted in a drop of the 
Bosnian refugees living abroad, a clear sign of the post-conflict recovery.20As of 2006, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina has not shown any trends of ethnic anxiety that might suggest conflict reoccurrence.  
The lessons from Bosnia and Herzegovina are multidimensional: identity-based conflict needs 
solid efforts at all levels of society that seek improvement of each sector, starting from political and 
economic stabilization to capacity building and establishment of civil society to refugee return and 
demographic recovery. As it was mentioned above, Bosnia still needs to work on all dimensions in order 
to achieve the levels of development of Western Europe. Nevertheless, lasting peace has been established 
due to extended peacebuidling missions and the improvements of the political and economic systems, 
backed up by relatively effective ongoing social programs. Since the short-term goals of political and 
economic stability and creation of power-sharing institutions have been achieved, the peacebuilding 
efforts are now directed to social development in order to meet the goals of long-term recovery. Thus, the 
systems of public health and education, despite their current levels of underdevelopment, are emphasized 
in state policies and are expected to be crucial in the years to come.  
B. El Salvador 
Contrary to the quick escalation of ethnic tensions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the civil 
conflict in El Salvador (See Map 3 El Salvador) traces its origins in the politico-economic struggles 
between the guerilla forces and the government. During the years preceding the conflict, different 
military factions would win power by setting up military coups. In 1979 junior officers staged a 
coup to put in place social and economic reforms. However, the new government did not manage to 
administer rapid change and cool down the tensions among parties vying for power, thus alienating 
key figures from the leftist and rightist movements. The inability of the government to respond to 
the social demands for change resulted in the political collapse of the administration. In 1980 the 
military formed an alliance with Partido Demócrata Cristiano (PDC), which resulted in the election 
of Mr. Napoleon Duarte as the president of the country.21 However, five guerilla forces joined 
together to form the FMLN (Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional) in order to 
oppose Duarte’s rule. As a result, numerous clashes between the FMLN, the death squads and the 
government claimed the lives of thousands of people during Duarte’s regime.  
Following the reforms of the government, the country made steps towards reestablishing the 
civilian rule after the mid-1980s. Alfredo Cristiani became the president in 1989 after rich 
landowners formed Arena (Alianza Republicana Nacionalista) and took control over the 
administration. Unfortunately, the FMLN and the death squads continued their guerilla war until 
the international community through the United Nations decided to initiate peace talks to terminate 
the killings of civilians and stop the gross violations of human rights. The crucial moment was the 
killing of six Jesuit priests, which catalyzed the negotiations. The UN brokered a peace agreement 
that was signed on January 16, 1992. The document required the FMLN to put down the arms and 
reintegrate ex-combatants into the political and social life of the state. Additionally, the peace 
accords required a reduced presence of the military, since most of the human rights violations were 
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conducted by the official government forces in the twelve-year long civil conflict, claiming the 
lives of nearly 75,000 civilians and displacing thousands of people.22 


























Source: Economist Intelligence Unit. El Salvador: Country Profile 2005. 
Gradually, the state headed for post-conflict recovery and stabilization. FLMN was officially 
recognized as a political party in 1994, turning into a legitimate opposition of Arena. Even though 
the latter has retained control over the presidency in the years to follow, FLMN has constantly 
advanced in the political sphere by increasing its influence on the local level through holding 
positions in municipalities. The period of regular coups was easily forgotten, leading to political 
stability from 1992 onwards. Nevertheless, the first years of peace had their shortcomings. The 
reduced military presence in the government and the power-struggles on the higher levels of society 
incited organized and common crime.23 However, new measures aiming at crime reduction 
contributed to the drop of the murder rate from 140 per 100,000 people in 1990s to 60 in 2002.24 
Other policies also include fighting of kidnapping as a source for financing guerillas and street 
gangs as well as robbery prevention measures.  
On the economic end, the country has been doing remarkably well. The adoption of the 
dollar in 2001 and changes in the structure of the economy over the past 20 years have led to the 
gradual substitution of the heavily agricultural economy with a service based one. The environment 
favors foreign investment, allowing steady and sustainable GDP growth. In the context of post-
conflict recovery, the policies of the Arena administration have been crucial in reintegrating former 
combatants and including larger portions of the population in the system. Privatization and 
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attraction of foreign direct investment to the country, paired with the low risk of armed conflict, 
predetermines good prospects for durable peace. El Salvador’s international treaties also contribute 
to the solidification of the economy, opening up the market for exports of local products. In that 
sense, the political and economic elites become more and more dependent on the different elements 
in the economy, thus reducing the chances of high level struggles at the expense of the rest of the 
society.  
The educational system in El Salvador has been going through numerous changes during the 
period following the peace agreement. Even though the spending of education is relatively low and 
the literacy rate of the population remains in the 70 percentile, the large scale reforms undertaken 
by Arena have resulted in higher levels of enrolment, while at the same time dropout and student 
repetitions rates have gone down.25 The efforts have been divided between improving the quality of 
education and enhancing the infrastructure in the poorest regions of the country, where inadequate 
education has been the main reason for high crime rates and unemployment in the service sector. 
The changes of the economic sector that require educated and skilled employees suggest that 
education reforms will be crucial for the pattern of unemployment in the country in the long-term. 
Thus, economic and political stability will depend on a large degree on the ability of the labor force 
to adjust to the requirements of the new economy, which in turns fluctuates according to the levels 
of training and education. As of now, El Salvador has shown that it is able to conduct strong 
policies to adjust to the current economic and political realities. The literacy rates have been 
steadily growing up which adds to the tendency of improving all aspects of education. Thus, one 
can expect a smooth transition from the period of post-conflict peacebuilding to sustainable and 
lasting peace. 
The system of public health has also gone through a series of reforms. In the years right 
before the civil conflict and throughout its duration, El Salvador was notorious was high levels of 
infant mortality and low life expectancy rates. However, the health system indicators have been 
slowly, but steadily improving over the past 15 years. Notable for the public health system is the 
distinction between the public hospitals and the private clinics. The low levels of investment by the 
government contribute to the poor quality of the services provided through the public institutions, 
which are frequently understaffed and lack adequate equipment. Additionally, over the past five 
years, the functions of public hospitals have been interrupted by sporadic strikes of the physicians 
and nurses that demand higher wages and better working conditions. In 2005, President Saca 
developed a new plan for public health funding, concentrating resources in the poor and rural areas 
that supposedly will improve the conditions in these regions of the country and stimulate better 
health indicator rates among the population. 
As seen from the comparison between Bosnia and Herzegovina and El Salvador, the 
challenges facing the post-conflict peacebuilding strategies and their relative effectiveness differ 
profusely. While Bosnia has been attempting to ameliorate identity-based incentives for conflict 
reoccurrence through extended peacebuilding operations, political and economic stabilization, and 
advances in the public health and education systems, El Salvador works towards the elimination of 
the politico-economic causes of conflict by opening the market to international trade, fortifying the 
political stability by the inclusion of format combatants and legitimization of guerilla forces as 
official political parties, and slow, but steady improvement of both public health and education. El 
Salvador had indisputably made progress in all areas that are pertinent to the establishment of 
durable peace 
Comparatively, the post-conflict recovery has led to better results in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, although the peace periods are different in duration. A possible explanation of the 
disparity might be the shorter period of the war and the stronger international presence after the 
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conflict: Serbs, Croats and Muslim fought for a little more than 3 years in an open war theatre, 
consequently taking advantage of the European aid and institutions that have been present on the 
territory of the state. At the same time, the conflict in El Salvador lasted for more than a decade, 
most of it due to the guerilla strikes against the government and the inability of the military to 
neutralize the revolutionaries. Additionally, the starting levels for the comparison were different: 
Bosnia had a better record of political and economic stability, with well-formulated system of 
public health and education. On the contrary, El Salvador had been torn by military juntas vying for 
power for decades, leading to political and economic volatility, which affected the social 
development in the country by causing poor social programming as the point of departure after 
peace had been achieved.  
The lessons from the post-conflict peacebuilding and state recovery are still vital for future 
peacebuilding strategies, especially in the Latin American region where most of the troubled states 
experience similar civil conflict patterns. The gradual and stable revival of El Salvador can be 
attributed to the various stages of state recovery. With the help of international organs and 
institutions, the country managed to create strong power-sharing institutions and legitimately 
include former combatants in the politics. This approach eliminates almost instantly the opposition 
between guerilla forces and the governments, since now power is accessible to all parties 
previously involved in the conflict. The stable political system paired with aggressive economic 
policies resulted in the attraction of foreign capitals, which jump-started the economy, leading to 
steady and sustainable economic growth over the years.  
On the social end, El Salvador has been trying to include larger portions of the population 
back into the economy by providing better social services. Even though the first years of peace 
were marked by high murder and crime rates, the government administered programs that 
successfully reduced these levels. Nevertheless, local problems persist, which requires that more 
policies regarding the reduction of the high rates of juvenile crime and delinquency should be put 
in place.26 A more integral approach is needed in order to mitigate the negative effects and changes 
in the demographic and economic patterns of the country, from the coming back of Salvadorian 
immigrants who have infringed the law in the United States. Some approaches have been effective: 
new policies aiming at the improvement of the system of education have increased literacy rates 
among all ages, allowing for the better economic integration in a changing and more skill-
demanding environment. Finally, the reforms in the public health sector have contributed to higher 
life expectancy rates, lower infant mortality rates, and better overall health system coverage, 
reaching out to the poor rural regions of the country. Combined with the economic and political 
stability, these factors reduce the incentives for conflict reoccurrence and create an ambience 
conducive to sustainable and durable peace. 
C.  Sierra Leone 
The civil war started in 1991, when the rebels from the Revolutionary United Force (RUF), 
headed by the British trained Foday Sayabana Sankoh, started an insurgency against Momoh’s 
regime. Torn by elite struggles on the top in the 1980s, Sierra Leone (See Map 4 Sierra Leone) was 
seen as an easy pray for its diamond rich territories, which instigated the organization of radical 
youths starving for material gains. Financed by the illegal diamond trade27 and supported militarily 
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  For more information about the increased levels of juvenile crime in El Salvador, please see Gonzalo Wielandt, "Hacia la 
construcción de lecciones del posconflicto en América Latina y El Caribe. Una mirada a la violencia juvenil en Centroamérica," in 
Políticas Sociales (Santiago de Chile, Chile: Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe, Organización de las Naciones 
Unidas, 2005). 
27
  See Douma, "The Political Economy of Internal Conflict: A Review of Contemporary Trends and Issues.." for more information on 
the topic.  
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by neighboring forces under the command of Charles Taylor, the RUF quickly took over some 
regions of the country in an attempt to control the diamond mines. Originally, the insurgency was 
not considered ideologically based aiming at political reforms and ultimately striving for power. 
Instead, it was driven by the monetary incentives offered by the easy access to diamond mines, 
weak government control over these regions, and the porous nature of the borders with Liberia and 
Guinea, which allowed for both export of diamonds and import of arms to feed RUF’s needs.  








































Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit. Sierra Leone: Country Profile 2005 
During the 1990s the presence of the RUF forces increased and the conflict between the 
insurgents and the government escalated. The insurgent forces opened a larger front including the 
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capital of Sierra Leone, Freetown. By the mid-1990’s Sankoh’s forces had increased their size to 
12,000.28 His influence forced president Kabbah to sign a peace agreement, calling for the 
immediate end of hostilities. The peace was never achieved, however, since in 1997 a new military 
coup replaced Kabbah as the head of state. The delicate situation and the ongoing hostilities 
prompted action on behalf of the international community.  
With the approval of the Security Council,29 the Economic Community of West African 
States had the green light to dispatch ECOMOG forces and try to fight the RUF. Additionally, the 
UN established the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) to provide 
logistics and create an atmosphere of political and economic stability. Shortly after ECOMOG 
forces moved to Sierra Leone, the Nigerian-led coalition was able to defeat the RUF and reinstated 
Kabbah as the president of the country. The action was commended by the UN Security Council, 
which issued Resolution 1156 and 1162, welcoming Kabbah as the head of state simultaneously 
ending the previously established arms embargo. Resolution 1162 extended the mission of 
ECOMOG, calling for the restoration of peace and security in the region.  
However, the negotiated peace did not last for long. In 1998 the RUF restarted the 
insurgency, attacking the capital of the country and fighting ECOMOG forces. This time, RUF’s 
tactics were ruthless: civilians were slaughtered, raped and mutilated, injuring thousands and 
causing the deaths of an estimated 6,000 people.30 The inability of the UNOMSIL and ECOMOG 
to hold the fire and neutralize the RUF led to the establishment of a larger UN mission, UNAMSIL, 
including the deployment of 6,000 soldiers and 260 military observers31 to be followed by an even 
larger military contingent of 11,000 soldiers a few months later. The fighting continued well into 
the year of 2000, when the UN presence began to show success - the disarmament, demobilization, 
and reintegration program (DDR) was gaining ground. President Kabbah announced the official 
end of the war with the RUF on January 18, 2002.  
After the peace accords the constitution was amended, changing the political system into 
more representative one. The first free elections followed shortly, when the opposition party All 
People’s Congress (APC) won by a landslide. Nevertheless, the establishment of strong political 
and power-sharing institutions has been Sierra Leone’s unicorn. The prosecution of war criminals 
with a de facto dysfunctional tribunal led to the resignation of the UN Special Court prosecutor in 
Sierra Leone, showing that the country is still far away from achieving political and economic 
stability. Additionally, a report issued by the International Crisis Group32 claimed that the short-
lived donations for the state recovery failed to address issues such as civil society building, 
disarmament, reforms in the legislative and executive branches, and amnesty of war criminals. 
According to the ICG, the country is still jeopardized by conflict reoccurrence. This notion is also 
enhanced by the weak control exercised at the borders of Liberia and Guinea, which suggests that 
arms and illegal diamond trade can fuel resources in the hands of former insurgents, in that manner 
creating incentives for the start of the conflict.  
Economically, Sierra Leone is still experiencing hardships in establishing a solid and open to 
international trade system. Firstly, the prolonged civil conflict has destroyed the infrastructure of 
the country, immensely exacerbating the timely recovery. The economy is mainly based on the 
extraction of natural resources, such as diamonds, gold and rutile. The second largest sector is 
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  W. Ofuatey-Kodjoe, "Sierra Leone," in Dealing with Conflict in Africa: The United Nations and Regional Organizations, ed. Jane 
Boulden (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), p.132 
29
  S/PRST/1997/36, July 11, 1997. Cited in W. Ofuatey-Kodjoe, "Sierra Leone," in Dealing with Conflict in Africa: The United 
Nations and Regional Organizations, ed. Jane Boulden (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003),  p.132 
30
  Frederick Fleitz, Peacekeeping Fiascoes of the 1990s: Causes, Solutions and U.S. Interests (Westport, Conn: Praeger, 2002). 166 
31
  UN Security Council Resolution 1270, 22 October, 1999. 
32
  Liberia and Sierra Leone: Rebuilding Failed States. Cited in "Sierra Leone: Country Profile 2005," (London: The Economist 
Intelligence Unit, 2005), p. 10. 
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agriculture, firmly established in the rural areas as means of providing money and food for the local 
population. Both sectors are underdeveloped and lack the necessary equipment to capitalize on the 
resources. Additionally, the corruption levels in the government and in the sector of extracting 
natural resources divert foreign investment, since international companies are wary of investing in 
an industry that depends on the fluctuations of the military forces, rebel groups, and government 
whims. According to Douma, this part of the economy even still finances insurgent groups and is 
mainly illegal.33  
Moreover, the local population is deemed to remain within the agricultural field, since the 
service sector is underdeveloped in the rural areas. Adding to the political instability that reduces 
the chances of economic growth, the gradual phase out of international institutions and 
peacebuilding forces, foreign investors will most likely wait for the final stabilization of Sierra 
Leone and the neighboring countries before relocating financial resources in the area. Thus, the 
society remains in the position of employees of the diamond extracting companies or self-
employees in the agricultural sectors without prospects of joining other industries.  
The situation seems even more complicated when one takes a look at the system of 
education. Even if foreign capitals and the service sector had been on the go, the human resources 
of Sierra Leone would have been unprepared to offer skilled labor. The system of education has 
been deteriorating in the past three decades,34 suffering from underdeveloped infrastructure, 
unqualified and insufficient staff, and poor curriculum. The war additionally exacerbated the 
situation by destroying schools and disconnecting rural areas from towns with primary, secondary, 
and tertiary institutions, thus depriving a large portion of the population from education, which 
explicates the disturbingly low literacy rates. Efforts have been made towards the improvement of 
the sector, but they are ad hoc measure undertaken by community leaders rather than centralized 
government programs. Currently, more attention is paid to the reconstruction and rehabilitation of 
the infrastructure, but government official are not involved in the process. The poor education and 
lack of financial resources in the lower social strata contrasts the conditions of the rich. The 
affluent members of the former insurgents groups and government officials, who further the gap 
between the classes by sending their children to schools abroad, thus augmenting the already 
existing political and economic elite. 
The system of public health has not been recovering, either. Although some health indicators 
show negligible improvement in the mortality, life expectancy, and health expenditure rates, the 
country lacks a centralized and organized health care system. The war displaced thousands of 
people, putting the burden in certain regions and alleviating others. The poor infrastructure paired 
with the inadequately trained and underpaid staff in overpopulated areas result in the poor quality 
of the health services. Additionally, epidemics related to poverty and poor hygiene, such as cholera 
and tuberculosis,35 lead to high mortality rates and low life expectancy. The government is 
concentrating on reviving the basic health services with the help of international institutions, 
however, the outbursts of diseases, high HIV/AIDS levels and poor living conditions require more 
efforts in the field if progress is to be made.  
Overall, the situation in Sierra Leone three years after the peace agreement does not look 
promising. Political and economic stability is elusive, due to the power struggles of insurgents, 
government elites and influential actors from neighboring states. The gradual phase out of 
international aid combined with the lack of foreign direct investment impedes the full-scale state 
recovery, putting Sierra Leone in a vicious circle of constant fluctuation between tension and 
relative peace. The shortage of resources hinders the recovery of infrastructure in all areas, 
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specifically in the ones of education and public health, leading to poorly prepared labor force and 
inadequate health coverage. Compared to Bosnia and Herzegovina and El Salvador, Sierra Leone is 
the least developed and recovered country in its short period of post-conflict peacebuilding. One of 
the reasons explaining the slow pace might be the instability in the region. Sierra Leone has not 
sufficiently addressed the causes of the conflict and remains liable to the influence of foreign actors 
who want to capitalize on the natural resources of the country. Additionally, the extended conflict 
and short period of relative peace might be playing a major role in the state recovery, which is a 
long resource-demanding process. 
The most important lessons for the study of post-conflict peacebuilding are probably the 
ones from Sierra Leone. The country was not able to address the causes of the politico-economic 
based conflict adequately, leading to the failure of the government to install political stability. This 
fluctuation deprived the country from vital economic resources, such as foreign aid and investment, 
which in turn provoked the failure in the recovery of the systems of education and public health. 
The short-term goals have yet to be achieved. As a result, the social development have been 
delayed, which suggests that parts of the population will not participate actively in the economic 
recovery of the country in the future due to their insufficient skills to perform more elaborate task 
than the ones that are required in the field of agriculture and the mining of natural resources. The 
solution to the problem lies in the international assistance. As in the case of El Salvador and Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, a political solution to the problems should come first, but in Sierra Leone it needs 
to be both within the country, and on a broader level, in the region. Strong power-sharing 
institutions that include all social strata and parties should also be put in place. Once the 
interference of negative foreign actors is reduced, the country can turn to economic recovery and 
attempt to attract foreign investment. A major part of it should be the utilization of natural 
resources that bring the capital back into the economy and not in the hands of private actors. Thus, 
the government will dispose of more resource to allocate to the systems of education and public 
health, which will be crucial in the creation of sustainable and durable peace in the long term. 
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IV. International Comparative 
Analysis36 
The international comparative study requires a closer look at 
some of the indicators that explain the progress made in the cases of 
post-conflict peacebuilding. In this section, This section will briefly 
analyze the statistical data available for Bosnia and Herzegovina, El 
Salvador and Sierra Leone in order to provide additional information 
for the importance of public health and education in creating an 
environment conducive to durable peace. The selection of the statistics 
is not randomly based. However, an initial assumption should be made 
in advance: the World Bank and the United Nations do not have the 
full set of data available for all of the cases.  
A. Education 
As it has been already discussed, the education in all of the 
selected post-conflict areas is going through reforms and changes that 
will eventually enhance the infrastructure, improve the quality of the 
curriculum and involve more trained staff in the sector. Public 
spending on education (See Chart 1 Public Spending on Education, 
total (% of GDP)) is one of the factors that demonstrates the efforts 
taken by the government to meet these goals. From the chart below we 
can see that El Salvador has increased the public spending in the 
sphere as a percentage of the GDP of the country and maintained it 
between 2.5% and 3% for the last five years.  At  the  same  time,  we 
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lack data about Bosnia and Herzegovina and the information available for Sierra Leone is limited 
only to the year 2000. The increased spending in El Salvador can be attributed to the programs 
involving rural and poor areas, where more resources are primarily directed to the rebuilding of the 
infrastructure. Such a sustained funding of education should lead to increased literacy rates and 
affect the overall panorama of education in the country. At the same time, the mark for Sierra 
Leone is two years before peace was established. The number, supposedly high, does not reflect the 
real picture, since the resources might not have been utilized properly, which is reflected at the 
poor infrastructure and understaffed schools in the rural areas of the country.  
Chart 1  
PUBLIC SPENDING ON EDUCATION  



















Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank 
The real disparity between the quality and reach of the system of education becomes evident 
when one looks at the literacy rates for adult females (ages 15 and above) who are considered part 
of the labor force (See Chart 2 Literacy rate, adult female (% of females ages 15 and above)). The 
higher numbers of Bosnia and Herzegovina for 2004, almost 10 years after the conflict, 
demonstrate that the reforms in the countries were executed in such a way that almost the entire 
female labor force has received some form of formal education, increasing the literacy rate and 
market competitiveness of this part of the population. At the same time, the number for El Salvador 
does not tell us enough about the post-conflict recovery of the country, since the data is from 1990, 
two years before the end of the conflict. On the other extreme remains Sierra Leone with a 
disturbing 24.42% of the female population that is literate in 2004. Assuming that there is a relative 
high coverage in the more urban areas of the country, the number might actually suggest that the 
real rates for female literacy in the rural parts are strikingly low. The pattern prompts that Sierra 
Leone needs to concentrate on education by at least providing basic primary schooling for females, 
since this part of the labor force is practically excluded from any jobs that require some form of 
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Chart 2  
LITERACY RATE, ADULT FEMALE  















Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank 
On the other side we have the male literacy rate for adults ages 15 and above (See Chart 3 
Literacy rate, adult male (% of males ages 15 and above)). The slightly better rates than the females 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina is statistically insignificant and show a well-developed system of 
education that provides at least basic schooling. Again, the data for El Salvador is before the peace 
agreement, but here we see a similar pattern of better educated males than females. For Sierra 
Leone, the difference is even more striking, since almost 20% more males are literate than females. 
That suggests that for all of the countries the government should work towards including the 
females in the system of education and providing them with basic schooling in order for them to be 
able to acquire jobs on the market. The case of Sierra Leone is very indicative of the approach 
toward schooling: while more males receive education, women are left out of the system, implying 
that there will be more males involved in high-demanding jobs than females.  
Chart 3  
LITERACY RATE, ADULT MALE  
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The long-term prospects of post-conflict peacebuilding also should focus on the youth 
portions of the population and their education and health, since they will be the executors of 
political and economic tasks in the near future. The literacy rate for youth males and females (See 
Chart 4 Literacy rate, youth female (% of females ages 15-24) and Chart 5 Literacy rate, youth 
male (% of males ages 15-24)) show better literacy rates than the overall picture of the labor force, 
suggesting that youths receive basic schooling more easily than other individuals. Another reason 
might be the better programs of education that have been administered after the peace agreements. 
In either case, the patterns demonstrate higher literacy rates for the youth, which is a positive sign 
for future economic stability and durable peace.  
Chart 4  
LITERACY RATE, YOUTH FEMALE  
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B. Public Health 
Similarly to the expenditure on education, the health care expenditure reflects the funding of the 
reforms in the sector (See Chart 6 Health expenditure, total (% of GDP)). From the chart below one can see 
how the levels of health expenditure as a percent of the GDP has remained stable over the years, if not gone 
down as in the case of El Salvador. However, when one breaks down the expenditure per capita, a positive 
trend can be seen. Governments spend relatively more money on health care than before, improving the 
health services by implicating reforms and changes that lead to better quality and broader outreach. 
Unfortunately, the spending on health care in Sierra Leone is incredibly low, accounting only for 7 US$ in 
the last two years. The trend, even if seemingly insignificant, is to go up, and hopefully the country will be 
able to reach the levels of Bosnia and Herzegovina and El Salvador in a few years after the end of the civil 
conflict. As it can be seen, El Salvador almost doubled the expenditure in the last five years, a sign that is 
promising for other countries if they pursue the right policies.  
Chart 6  
HEALTH EXPENDITURE, TOTAL  














Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank. 
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The increase coverage of public health services can be measured by the attended births by 
skilled personnel. Again, Bosnia and Herzegovina shows significantly high levels, which improved 
over the years between the start of the conflict and its end (See Chart 8 Births attended by skilled 
health staff (% of total)). That signifies that the post-conflict recovery efforts have been successful 
in reaching portions of the population that had not been able to receive medical services before. A 
huge increase in the same sector is registered in El Salvador. During the ten-year peace the births 
attended by skilled staff almost doubled, going after the numbers of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
Sierra Leone still remains on the lower end of the chart with only 41.7% two years before the end 
of the conflict. Again, since El Salvador was able to institute reforms that doubled its figures in 10 
years, one can hope that Sierra Leone will follow similar health care policies in order to provide 
better services.  
Chart 8  
BIRTHS ATTENDED BY SKILLED HEALTH STAFF  














Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank. 
 
The attended births are in part due to the more and better qualified staff in the hospitals (See 
Table 1 Physicians (per 1,000 people)). The big jump in health services in El Salvador is partly due 
to the increase of the number of Physicians per 1,000, which has been steadily going up in the past 
few years. At the same time, Bosnia and Herzegovina registers a small decline in the sector, 
nevertheless still maintaining higher levels than El Salvador. Sierra Leone again remains on the 
other extreme by having only .03 physicians per 1,000 people, or put in other words, 3 qualified 
physicians for 100,000 people. Paired with the unsatisfactory infrastructure of the public hospitals, 
the problem is even more troubling and calls for immediate reforms of the public health system.  
Table 1  
PHYSICIANS  
(per 1,000 people) 
 
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank. 
 
  1990 1995 1996 1997 2002 2003 2004 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 1.57     1.34  
El Salvador 0.84 0.91  1.07 1.24   
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The results of the reforms in the public health system show a positive trend in the increased 
rates of life expectancy and decrease in all mortality rates (See Chart 9 Mortality rate, infant (per 
1,000 live births)). The infant morality rate for Bosnia and Herzegovina has been decreasing 
constantly, but the significant change is in El Salvador, which almost reduced twice the number of 
deaths in infants per 1,000 births. Sierra Leone still registers high levels of infant mortality, 




MORTALITY RATE, INFANT  
























Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank. 
  
A similar pattern is shown in the under-5 years of age mortality rates (See Chart 10 
Mortality rate, under-5 (per 1,000)). Here, however, Sierra Leone demonstrates higher numbers of 
death per 1,000, which suggest that more than 28% of the children who survive during birth die 
before they have turned five years. The explanation for this model might vary: high risk of 
epidemics, undernourishment, lack or low-quality of medical services. In either case, the 
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Chart 10  






















Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank. 
All three countries display reduced rates of mortality rates for adult males and females (See Chart 
11 Mortality rate, adult, female (per 1,000 female adults) and Chart 12 Mortality rate, adult, male (per 
1,000 male adults)). As expected, the overall rates for females are lower than the ones for males, which 
can be explained through the involvement of males in the army or insurgent forces during the war. The 
trend is encouraging in terms of better health services provided for adults. Nevertheless, the government 
of Sierra Leone should work more in the field to bring down the numbers. 
Chart 11  
MORTALITY RATE, ADULT, FEMALE 
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Chart 12 
MORTALITY RATE, ADULT, MALE  











Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank. 
 
Chart 13 



















Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank. 
  
The final measure of the public health system involves the changes in the life expectancy 
rate, which reflects the overall improvement of the sector (See Chart 13 Life expectancy at birth, 
total (years)). In Bosnia and Herzegovina, people leave on average two more years than they used 
to before the conflict. El Salvador shows the biggest improvement again, increasing the life 
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area, the life expectancy at birth of 41 years on average is disturbingly low. The economy of the 
country is mainly affected, because it reduces the years of physically active labor force to nearly 
half of that of the other two countries. Thus, not only the demographic patterns of the country are 
affected, but also the economic growth and development. The administration in Sierra Leone 
should invest more in the public health system by increasing the number of physicians per person, 
improving the infrastructure and concentrating on the poor and rural regions of the country, where 
the population is affected the most by the lack of sufficient health services.  
C. Economic Indicators 
As a result of the improvement of the systems of education and public health, all of the three 
countries have shown stable economic growth during the years after the end of the conflict. What is 
interesting here is the relatively high economic growth in the first or the second year right after the 
signing of the pace agreement (See Chart 14 GDP growth (annual %)). The annual GDP growth in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina skyrocketed in 1996 to nearly 90% after the peace agreement has been 
signed, jump-starting the economy and providing a healthy environment for government reforms. 
The same pattern can be seen in El Salvador, although the numbers are not that significant. The 
reason for lower GDP growth in El Salvador might be the transfer of the economy from 
predominantly agricultural in its nature to service-based. Sierra Leone also demonstrates higher 
GDP growth in the year after the end of the conflict, even though the levels are essentially lower 
from the ones of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Nevertheless, the post-conflict peacebuilding increases 
the chances of better economic performance. Sierra Leone regressed in the years of most intense 
conflict, but returned to positive levels after tensions have cooled down and even further increased 
the numbers after the official end of the conflict.  
Chart 14 
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The data supports the main thesis that multidimensional peacebuilding strategies should be 
in force in areas that have suffered from civil conflict. More specifically, the results imply that the 
systems of public health and education seem to be crucial in the long-term recovery of the state, 
improving the conditions of the population and leading to economic growth and development. 
Naturally, all dimensions of the state recovery should be enhanced. Political stability and healthy 
economy are necessary for the development and implementation of reforms in the social sector that 
can provide the long-term capacity building and complete recovery of troubled states. Power-
sharing institutions and the reintegration of former combatants in the public life are also 
imperative. The relatively better recovery of Bosnia and Herzegovina and El Salvador also suggests 
that once the causes of the conflict have been addressed adequately, more emphasis should be put 
on improving the infrastructure and quality of the systems of education and public health. Thus, 
social development will decrease the chances of conflict reoccurrence by involving the society in 
all sectors of public life and creating dependent connections between the ruling strata and the labor 
force.  
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V. Lessons Learnt and 
Recommendations 
The cases of Bosnia and Herzegovina, El Salvador and Sierra 
Leone provide us with valuable information about future strategizing in 
areas emerging from conflict. Even though in some post-conflict regions 
the situation in might seem a primarily internal issue that should be 
addressed by the sovereign government without outside interference, the 
lessons learnt from the studied cases offer policies that could be useful in 
establishing durable peace. In any case, some conflicts require that a 
peacebuilding force is established, because it would be hard for the local 
authorities of any troubled state to terminate the fighting and head towards 
a post-conflict state recovery and capacity building. The politico-economic 
or identity based conflict should be approached aggressively with 
appropriate policies and measures that will lay the grounds for elimination 
of the causes of the conflict, and consequently establish durable peace. 
Considering the cases already discussed, we can focus on certain fields to 
suggest possible policies that will be instrumental to this end. 
A. Political stability 
Even if the local government strongly opposes revolutionary groups 
and guerilla forces in the cases of intrastate conflict, there is a need of 
more structured approach towards establishing political stability. New 
governments are prone to creating political chaos even when minor 
changes in the structure of administration take place. Therefore, there are 
certain steps that should be taken in order to consolidate the political 
power and create long-term political stability: 
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• A dialogue between the parties involved in the conflict should be initiated. Since the 
efforts of the government have not yielded promising results, the interference of an 
international organ is necessary to secure peace talks and possibly a peace agreement.  
• The peace agreement should include measures that address the causes of the conflict, 
suggesting viable solutions that satisfy the involved parties and create incentives for the 
stop of hostilities. 
• The presence of government authorities should be increased especially in the rural and 
poor areas of the country. Similar to the case of Sierra Leone, illegal trade fuels more 
resources in the hands of the guerilla and insurgent groups, which capitalize on the weak 
government control in order to execute their activities.  
• International assistance in achieving peace and security should be paired with local 
forces in establishing peace and conducting post-conflict peacebuilding operations. The 
lack of local resources frequently impedes the processes of peacebuilding, thus creating 
incentives for conflict reoccurrence. 
• Strong anti-corruption policies should be administered in order to fight internal forces 
working within the government that aim at retaining the conflict alive in order to incur 
financial gains from the guerilla forces.  
• The new government should promote the inclusion of former combatants and other 
members of society that have not been previously involved in the decision-making 
processes. 
• Government officials and international staff should concentrate on building strong and 
durable power-sharing institutions that will allow the reviving state to execute 
democratic policies and eliminate elitist rule on the top.  
• The administration should address the weaknesses in the legal, judicial and executive 
branches in order to remove or improve dysfunctional programs and institutions.  
B. Economic Stability 
The political and economic stability are indisputably linked in the post-conflict state 
recovery. Once the country has stabilized politically, it can recover economically by offering 
securities for foreign direct investment and conducting policies that benefit economic growth and 
development.  
• The government should provide secure environment for foreign direct investment and 
local capital. If the investments are jeopardized by local factors such as corruption, 
guerilla forces, and government favoritism, the country will not benefit from foreign 
capitals that can jump-start the economy and provide funding for social programs.  
• New policies that cater the needs of the changing economic realities should be installed 
in a timely manner. Thus, if a change in the nature of the economy occurs, for example 
from mainly agricultural to mainly service-based economy as in the case of El Salvador, 
the labor force and the economic environment will be ready to adjust to it quickly.  
• More attention should be paid to the reconstruction, rehabilitation, and rebuilding of the 
infrastructure related to economic activities. Roads, ports, international airports, and 
communications should become a priority in the revival of the economy. 
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• The government should also utilize the local resources to the full extent by devising 
policies for the better capitalization of natural resources and human capital to create 
economic agility.  
C. Public Health 
Frequently, the efforts of the government and the international organizations working in the 
country are directed towards achieving the short-term goals of political and economic stability. 
However, as we have seen in the cases of Bosnia and Herzegovina and El Salvador, the 
improvement of the system of health is crucial in the long-term peacebuilding processes by 
providing stable demographic pattern and strong labor force ready to participate in the economic 
recovery of the state. One of the lessons from the studied cases is the significance of the advances 
made in the quality of the health services and their outreach. The post-conflict peacebuilding 
strategies should necessarily include the overall improvement of the public health system by 
increasing the quality of the services offered to the citizenry. 
That includes: 
• Improving the infrastructure of the health sector by building new hospitals and clinics in 
addition to the rehabilitation of the already existing substructure; 
• Providing the necessary equipment in areas where lack of resources has affected the 
population the most. 
• Concentrating resources in previously deprived groups in the rural and poor areas of the 
country.  
• Improving the conditions of medical workers and staff. 
• Creating incentives for additional training of physicians and nurses in order for them to 
be able to adequately address bursts of epidemics and improve the quality of the health 
services.  
• Reducing infant mortality and under-5 mortality rates. 
• Offering better health plans for adults and providing financial assistance for families and 
individuals that are not able to afford health care.  
D. Education 
The studied cases suggest that economic recovery and political stability require good and 
accessible educational system. As it has already been mentioned, the changing requirements of the 
economy demand better-trained and skilled labor. Especially in the cases of heavily agricultural 
societies, education might prove to be crucial in reintegrating former combatants in the economy 
and offering more options to the poor layers of society. The insurgent groups and revolutionaries 
usually recruit their fighters among the poor portions of the population, offering them an easy way 
out of misery if they join their forces. Additionally, farmers and agriculture workers usually engage 
in and advance illegal activities that offer material gains, because their lack of education and 
training deprives them from the opportunity to be economically mobile and competitive. More 
efforts in this area will allow the previously uneducated part of the labor force to join more 
demanding industries, thus making it easier for unemployed individuals to find a job. 
The measures that need to be taken entail: 
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• Improvement of the infrastructure of the system of education. The population should have 
access to better infrastructure, such as class rooms, desks, and other school-related 
materials in order to benefit from the education.  
• Better-trained and better-paid staff that will offer a higher quality education. The case of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina suggests that the education system needs qualified staff that is 
driven by financial incentives to fulfill their task. Educators that have experience in the 
field of instruction do not necessarily posses pedagogical skills that are vital for lower-
grade students.  
• Advances in the conditions of the workers in all of the three levels – primary, secondary, 
and tertiary.  
• Incentives for parents and families to send their children to school. Frequently, the 
families depend on the labor of the child in providing food for the family and the parents 
are unwilling to lose one worker for a longer period of time. The issue can be addressed 
by providing subsidies for low-income families not only to pay for the school-related 
expenses, but also to cover the opportunity cost of sending their child to school. 
• Policies aiming to increase the enrolment of females. The females are usually less 
competitive on the market, due to their lack of former education. The literacy rates, as 
seen in the case of Sierra Leone, suggest that the males enjoy more economic mobility 
because of their better education. Thus, families that consist of one educated parent face 
the challenge to encounter jobs in their living area that will correspond to the level of 
education of both parents.  
• Revised curriculum and school and after-school programs. The youths (ages 15-24) will 
be the main actors in the years to come in sustaining peace and promoting economic and 
political stability. Even if some of the older citizens might remain illiterate, resources 
should be mainly directed toward the education of the youth, especially in the poor and 
rural areas.  
The aforementioned policies and changes are just a small part of the multifaceted process of 
post-conflict peacebuilding. Some of them might have had success in Bosnia and Herzegovina, El 
Salvador, and even Sierra Leone, but might turn out to be useless in other cases. Naturally, each 
case should be approached separately by adjusting peacebuilding strategies to it specifically, and 
not applying general theories of peacebuilding. However, the policies that have been proposed 
seem to have worked in the previously discussed countries, even though their background, location, 
conflict duration and peacebuilding operations have been distinct in their nature, which suggests 
that they will be useful in future peacebuilding operations. Thus, learning from the lessons of 
previously troubled areas, we can construct a more successful framework for addressing post-
conflict recovery that might be crucial for cases such as Haiti and Colombia, where intrastate 
conflict has been reoccurring for years. 
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VI. Conclusion 
The 1990s and even much of the early 2000s have been marked 
by the increased number of intrastate conflicts that cause the death of 
thousands of civilians, displace large parts of the population and 
forces individuals or even entire communities to seek shelter in 
foreign countries. The causes of the conflict have varied significantly, 
from internally politico-economical and identity based clashes to 
externally inspired confrontations of opportunistic actors. War-torn 
societies find it difficult to broker peace among the parties involved in 
the conflict, extenuating the duration of the clashes and increasing the 
death tolls. However, the new status quo on the international arena has 
allowed the expanded involvement of international actors and 
organizations, such as the United Nations, the World Bank, and even 
the IMF, thus giving hope to troubled areas that peace could and 
should be achieved.  
The involvement of the international community, however, is 
not limited to the administration of the peace agreement. In a lot of 
cases the states find it difficult to recover fully from the extended 
conflict and relapse to violence shortly after a fragile peace has been 
brokered. In others, such as the ones of Bosnia and Herzegovina, El 
Salvador, and Sierra Leone, the post-conflict peacebuilding processes 
have yielded significant results and have made progress toward the 
long-term recovery of the state and the establishment of durable peace. 
The mistakes made by the peacebuilders are sometimes fatal for the 
peace, but they nevertheless provide useful examples of what kind 
PCPB strategies work and what do not.  
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From the studied cases we have seen that political and economic stability matters extensively 
for the peace and security of the region and the state. However, since these are the short-term goals, 
international organizations and local actors commit the mistake of concentrating too many 
resources in these areas, seemingly dismissing social development as a crucial part of the long-term 
post-conflict recovery. Bosnia, El Salvador, and even Sierra Leone suggest that efforts in the sphere 
of public health and education should be an integral part of every war-torn society in order to 
achieve higher levels of capacity building and state recovery. Moreover, education and public 
health are strongly linked to the political and economic stability of the country, and while 
international aid and foreign assistance can establish an ephemeral stability, only better education 
and public health services, in an integrated human development framework, can retain it once 
foreign assistance is gradually reduced.  
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